Who Should Call The Shots? Resolving Friction in the Targeting Process: Clausewitz, Clinton, Cohen, Wesley Clark, Colin Powell, Vietnam, Kosovo, Iraq, Gulf War

This study seeks to determine sources of friction between military and civilian leaders during a target nomination and approval process. The author first develops a theoretical foundation for understanding the factors influencing the target selection and approval. The factors identified are used as a lens to examine the following case studies: the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and Operation Allied Force. These case studies revealed several factors that contributed to friction between the various participants. The study identified that the primary factor influencing friction is the expectations of the players involved that are not fulfilled. The most influential cause of friction in the targeting process was the lack of a coherent strategy that properly applied force to obtain the desired objectives. Moreover, when there were limitations with the strategy, and the role of targeting within that strategy, the players involved were not advised of the fact before the strategy was selected. They were not able to adjust their expectations, thus resulting in friction. The study also revealed that the inherent differences in strategic interests between military and civilian leaders contribute to friction. Finally, the examination of the processes used for each case indicated that an ad hoc process was probably the best method. However, cases with significant friction had processes that failed to account for relevant factors that could have been avoided.

Topics and subjects covered include: General Wesley Clark, Clausewitz, Jomini, Bill Clinton, William Cohen, Colin Powell, Vietnam, Schwarzkopf, Kosovo, Iraq, Target Nomination, Gulf War, NATO.