The Politics of Naval Innovation: Studies of Historical Cases of How Technologically Advanced Systems Went From the Drawing Board to the Fleet, Tomahawk Cruise Missile, AEGIS Combat System

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book examines how innovations in technology and doctrine can help trigger revolutions in military affairs by studying historical cases of how technologically advanced systems found their way from the drawing board to the fleet. The cases studied are the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Aegis combat system. The research analyzes the advocacy techniques used to advance these systems and does so through a combined political science/organizational theory lens.

Chapter 1 * Introduction * (Bradd C. Hayes) * Study Design * Military Innovation * An Overview of Organization and Innovation Theory * Technical Innovation and the Navy * Innovation and the Innovator * Chapter 2 * Cruise Missiles and the Tomahawk * (Gregory A. Engel) * Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) * Air- and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM/GLCM) * The Joint Cruise Missile Project Office * Final Political Notes * Chapter 3 * Aegis Evolutionary or Revolutionary Technology? * (Thomas C. Hone, Douglas V. Smith, Roger C. Easton, Jr.) * Introduction * The Politics of Aegis Development * Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer: Manager and Entrepreneur * Meyer's Congressional Strategy * Meyer's Approach to the Navy and OSD * Entrepreneur's Whiplash * Revisiting the Issues * The Aegis Program in Context * Chapter 4 * Who's That Tall Dark Stranger There? * (Douglas V. Smith) * Technology for Technology's Sake * Military Culture and the Element of Risk * Inter-Service Rivalries * Navy vs. Navy * Technical vs. Managerial Competence in Program Management * Outside Program Manipulation * Innovative Programs Outside the Military Mainstream * Chapter 5 * Conclusions * (Bradd C. Hayes) * Implications for the Future * Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed

The value of this study for students of revolutions in military affairs is found in its reexamination of past theories of innovation by testing them against new case studies. Although no one theory emerged superior, the authors of this report found many of the points raised by previous studies to be applicable to today's new security environment. The authors also strike a note of caution. Even though there seems to be a consensus that innovation is needed in order for the US to maintain the world's most powerful and sophisticated military, there are pitfalls which, if not avoided, could result in stagnation.

This stagnation could come about as a result of numerous trends, including: the traditional drawdown following the conclusion of a conflict (in this case, the Cold War) with no new peer competitor looming on the horizon; a fiscally constrained environment (which threatens to cut research and development funds and consolidate or eliminate laboratories, war colleges, etc.); the increasing move towards centralized control of programs and doctrine (as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation); the military's aversion to innovative mavericks (i.e., a Rickover syndrome); and the fact that fewer and fewer politicians and political appointees have any military experience.

Several counter-trends offer some hope that the US military will remain innovative. Individuals, such as Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are helping to raise awareness of the issues surrounding innovation. There is also the historical theory that long periods of peace are the most fertile for fomenting revolutions in military affairs. Even so, the implications of many of the current trends noted in this volume are worth consideration.