The Fallacy of Scientific Truth: Why Science Succeeds Despite Ultimate Ignorance

Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, Epistemology
Cover of the book The Fallacy of Scientific Truth: Why Science Succeeds Despite Ultimate Ignorance by Donald R. Miklich, Donald R. Miklich
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Donald R. Miklich ISBN: 9781311009135
Publisher: Donald R. Miklich Publication: November 7, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Donald R. Miklich
ISBN: 9781311009135
Publisher: Donald R. Miklich
Publication: November 7, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

Scientific knowledge is vastly and overwhelmingly humanity's greatest achievement. Furthermore, if humanity is to survive, either on this planet or perhaps eventually elsewhere in the universe, it will do so only because of scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge is not truth.
To assert any scientific knowledge to be true is to assert that beyond doubt we know the phenomena at issue occur for exactly and only the reason(s) specified by the scientific knowledge, and we similarly know they do so occur and will so occur at any time and at any place in the universe where the causal reason(s) obtain.
To claim scientific knowledge does not reach this truth standard is not new. Philosophers of science generally hold scientific knowledge always to be tentative and subject to refinement and/or replacement if and when new evidence is found. Therefore, scientists never use the word "truth" to describe their conclusions. Unfortunately, however, while theoretical scientists are too circumspect to call scientific conclusions true, they frequently treat them as if they were true. The most conspicuous examples of this are those cases, exceedingly common, wherein a scientific conclusion is used as the premise from which impossible-to-test deductions are drawn, and then these empirically unverifiable deductions are presented to the nonscientist public as certain scientific knowledge, the validity of which everyone who is not an intellectual troglodyte is obligated to accept and believe. The inescapable logical fact, however, is that no such deduction can be more certain than the uncertain scientific conclusion it is based on. Nevertheless, theoretical scientists have, with considerable success, propagandized and proselytized this illogical heretical scientific practice to the nonscientist public as standard procedure.
Scientifically, this disingenuous practice, this "Don't call scientific conclusions truth, but go ahead and treat them as truth anyway" practice has the cost of causing scientists to ignore the inescapable fact that scientific knowledge is a work in progress, and it always will be. Scientists must never close their minds to the possibility that even our most securely established scientific knowledge may be wrong, and might be improved if we made the effort. But more importantly, I am concerned that this practice of passing theoretical speculations off to the public as scientific knowledge may be partly responsible for the obstinate refusal of many nonscientists in the United States to accept and act upon scientific knowledge which is empirically well supported, scientific knowledge which has the well established ability to reliably improve human existence.
The purpose of this essay is to try to inform the scientifically skeptical nonscientist of the difference between such unreliable and untrustworthy theoretical science excesses and reliable scientific knowledge. Though not in this order, it will: Illustrate how theoreticians treat scientific knowledge as truth; Explain why scientific knowledge is not truth; Explain what scientific knowledge really is; Show why it is enormously successful, reliable and useful even though it is not truth; Point out how the presumption of scientific truth is itself destructive of scientific knowledge; and finally, Note the implications of all of this for theoretical and practical science issues.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Scientific knowledge is vastly and overwhelmingly humanity's greatest achievement. Furthermore, if humanity is to survive, either on this planet or perhaps eventually elsewhere in the universe, it will do so only because of scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge is not truth.
To assert any scientific knowledge to be true is to assert that beyond doubt we know the phenomena at issue occur for exactly and only the reason(s) specified by the scientific knowledge, and we similarly know they do so occur and will so occur at any time and at any place in the universe where the causal reason(s) obtain.
To claim scientific knowledge does not reach this truth standard is not new. Philosophers of science generally hold scientific knowledge always to be tentative and subject to refinement and/or replacement if and when new evidence is found. Therefore, scientists never use the word "truth" to describe their conclusions. Unfortunately, however, while theoretical scientists are too circumspect to call scientific conclusions true, they frequently treat them as if they were true. The most conspicuous examples of this are those cases, exceedingly common, wherein a scientific conclusion is used as the premise from which impossible-to-test deductions are drawn, and then these empirically unverifiable deductions are presented to the nonscientist public as certain scientific knowledge, the validity of which everyone who is not an intellectual troglodyte is obligated to accept and believe. The inescapable logical fact, however, is that no such deduction can be more certain than the uncertain scientific conclusion it is based on. Nevertheless, theoretical scientists have, with considerable success, propagandized and proselytized this illogical heretical scientific practice to the nonscientist public as standard procedure.
Scientifically, this disingenuous practice, this "Don't call scientific conclusions truth, but go ahead and treat them as truth anyway" practice has the cost of causing scientists to ignore the inescapable fact that scientific knowledge is a work in progress, and it always will be. Scientists must never close their minds to the possibility that even our most securely established scientific knowledge may be wrong, and might be improved if we made the effort. But more importantly, I am concerned that this practice of passing theoretical speculations off to the public as scientific knowledge may be partly responsible for the obstinate refusal of many nonscientists in the United States to accept and act upon scientific knowledge which is empirically well supported, scientific knowledge which has the well established ability to reliably improve human existence.
The purpose of this essay is to try to inform the scientifically skeptical nonscientist of the difference between such unreliable and untrustworthy theoretical science excesses and reliable scientific knowledge. Though not in this order, it will: Illustrate how theoreticians treat scientific knowledge as truth; Explain why scientific knowledge is not truth; Explain what scientific knowledge really is; Show why it is enormously successful, reliable and useful even though it is not truth; Point out how the presumption of scientific truth is itself destructive of scientific knowledge; and finally, Note the implications of all of this for theoretical and practical science issues.

More books from Epistemology

Cover of the book Modest Nonconceptualism by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book The Mind Pyramid by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book El Método 5 by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Idealization and the Aims of Science by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Nietzsche’s Nihilism in Walter Benjamin by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Approaching the Navel of the Darkened Soul by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Faith and Humility by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book The Architecture of Reason by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book همسات سريالية by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature and Modern Skepticism by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book The Normative Web by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Intellectual Virtues by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Personal Knowledge by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book John of the Cross and the Cognitive Value of Mysticism by Donald R. Miklich
Cover of the book Epistemology, Context, and Formalism by Donald R. Miklich
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy