Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310857478 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | July 3, 2016 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
Author: | Progressive Management |
ISBN: | 9781310857478 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management |
Publication: | July 3, 2016 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
Language: | English |
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This study examines the airpower tenet of centralized control, which US Air Force doctrine has traditionally upheld as the foundation for organizing, planning, and executing joint air operations. The tenet is examined from both an organizational and a battle management aspect. The organizational aspect refers to the command and procedural arrangements that permit a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to achieve unity of air effort. It is the JFACC's span of control. The battle management aspect refers to the JFACC's actions in the process of planning and executing theater air operations. It is the JFACC's level of control. Most doctrinal publications that mention JFACC operations focus on the organizational aspect, and not the battle management aspect of the tenet of centralized control. This study examines both aspects of the airpower tenet. It first covers the evolution of the air component commander's span of control, which prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 rarely permitted unity of air effort. Next it examines the JFACC levels of control exercised in Operations DESERT STORM and DELIBERATE FORCE and looks at six factors that either instigated or facilitated these different levels of control. The six factors examined are (1) the command and procedural arrangements established for the JFACC, (2) the command and control technology available in theater, (3) the status of JFACC doctrine prior to the operations, (4) the scale of air operations, (5) the criticality of certain decisions and tasks in air operations, and (6) the JFACC's leadership style. Finally, this study generates conclusions from the DESERT STORM and DELIBERATE FORCE operations and provides suggestions on how Air Force doctrine should change to reflect and anticipate the flexibility inherent to the airpower tenet of centralized control.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * CHAPTER 2 - ORGANIZATIONAL AND BATTLE MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL * The Organizational Aspect of the Tenet of Centralized Control * The Battle Management Aspect of the Tenet of Centralized Control * Factors That Influence the JFACC's Level of Control * Summary * CHAPTER 3 - THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER'S SPAN OF CONTROL * The European Theater in World War II * The Korean War * The Vietnam War * The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the JFACC * The Persian Gulf War * Operation DELIBERATE FORCE * Summary * CHAPTER 4 - JFACC LEVELS OF CONTROL IN DESERT STORM AND DELIBERATE FORCE * Chapter 4 is located in the Balkan Air Campaign Study room located at the AF Historical Research Agency * CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM DESERT STORM AND DELIBERATE FORCE CASE STUDIES * Criticality of Decisions and Tasks * Command Arrangements * Scale of Operations * C3I Technology Available * JFACC Leadership Style * Status of JFACC Doctrine * Conclusion
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This study examines the airpower tenet of centralized control, which US Air Force doctrine has traditionally upheld as the foundation for organizing, planning, and executing joint air operations. The tenet is examined from both an organizational and a battle management aspect. The organizational aspect refers to the command and procedural arrangements that permit a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to achieve unity of air effort. It is the JFACC's span of control. The battle management aspect refers to the JFACC's actions in the process of planning and executing theater air operations. It is the JFACC's level of control. Most doctrinal publications that mention JFACC operations focus on the organizational aspect, and not the battle management aspect of the tenet of centralized control. This study examines both aspects of the airpower tenet. It first covers the evolution of the air component commander's span of control, which prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 rarely permitted unity of air effort. Next it examines the JFACC levels of control exercised in Operations DESERT STORM and DELIBERATE FORCE and looks at six factors that either instigated or facilitated these different levels of control. The six factors examined are (1) the command and procedural arrangements established for the JFACC, (2) the command and control technology available in theater, (3) the status of JFACC doctrine prior to the operations, (4) the scale of air operations, (5) the criticality of certain decisions and tasks in air operations, and (6) the JFACC's leadership style. Finally, this study generates conclusions from the DESERT STORM and DELIBERATE FORCE operations and provides suggestions on how Air Force doctrine should change to reflect and anticipate the flexibility inherent to the airpower tenet of centralized control.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * CHAPTER 2 - ORGANIZATIONAL AND BATTLE MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL * The Organizational Aspect of the Tenet of Centralized Control * The Battle Management Aspect of the Tenet of Centralized Control * Factors That Influence the JFACC's Level of Control * Summary * CHAPTER 3 - THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER'S SPAN OF CONTROL * The European Theater in World War II * The Korean War * The Vietnam War * The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the JFACC * The Persian Gulf War * Operation DELIBERATE FORCE * Summary * CHAPTER 4 - JFACC LEVELS OF CONTROL IN DESERT STORM AND DELIBERATE FORCE * Chapter 4 is located in the Balkan Air Campaign Study room located at the AF Historical Research Agency * CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM DESERT STORM AND DELIBERATE FORCE CASE STUDIES * Criticality of Decisions and Tasks * Command Arrangements * Scale of Operations * C3I Technology Available * JFACC Leadership Style * Status of JFACC Doctrine * Conclusion