Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
Nonfiction, Science & Nature, Mathematics, Game Theory, Business & Finance, Management & Leadership, Operations Research
| Author: | Demet Çetiner | ISBN: | 9783642358227 |
| Publisher: | Springer Berlin Heidelberg | Publication: | April 3, 2013 |
| Imprint: | Springer | Language: | English |
| Author: | Demet Çetiner |
| ISBN: | 9783642358227 |
| Publisher: | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| Publication: | April 3, 2013 |
| Imprint: | Springer |
| Language: | English |
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
