Coercion for Hire: A Theory of Indirect Coercion - Four Historical Cases, Indonesia, Italy, Chile, Hezbollah, Surrogate Targeting, Covert/Overt Balance, Role of Positive Inducements, Political Warfare

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The purpose of this study is to examine the use of indirect coercion as an element of political warfare and as a policy option for the United States. This thesis synthesizes the concepts of indirect strategy and coercion to provide a cost-effective policy option for U.S. decision makers. In order to establish the strategic utility of indirect coercion, this thesis examines the conditions that are necessary for successful coercion of an adversary using limited military and economic resources. This thesis examines four historical cases of indirect coercion. The cases examined are Indonesia, Italy, and Chile during the early Cold War era, and Hezbollah as an ongoing case—to explore the varying outcomes, from success to complete failure. The analysis of the case studies examines surrogate targeting, the covert/overt balance, surrogate vs. sponsor centricity, and the role of positive inducements.

Chapter I - Introduction * A. Statement Of Purpose And Scope * B. Background * C. Research Question * D. Theoretical Framework * 1. Hypothesis * 2. Supporting Hypotheses * A. Hypothesis 1 * B. Hypothesis 2 * C. Hypothesis 3 * D. Hypothesis 4 * 3. Critical Definitions * A. Coercive Diplomacy * B. Indirect Warfare * C. Political Warfare * D. Indirect Coercion * E. Key Actors * 4. Caveat * E. Methodology * 1. Hypothesis * A. Supporting Hypothesis 1 * B. Supporting Hypothesis 2 * C. Supporting Hypothesis 3 * D. Supporting Hypothesis 4 * 2. Case Selection * F. Organization And Chapter Overview * Chapter Ii - Indonesia Case Study * A. Introduction * B. Historical Overview * 1. Sponsor Situation * 2. Target Situation * 3. Surrogate Situation * C. Analysis * 1. Through The Lens Of The Hypotheses * 2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 * 3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 * 4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 * 5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 * 6. Conclusions * Chapter Iii - Chilean Case Study * A. Introduction * B. Historical Overview * 1. Early Years Of Covert Action Success * 2. Track I And Track Ii: Shortcomings Of Covert Action * 3. Inevitable Failure * C. Analysis * 1. Chile Case Through The Lens Of The Hypotheses * 2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 * 3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 * 4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 * 5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 * D. Conclusion * Chapter Iv - Hezbollah Case Study * A. Introduction * B. Historical Overview * 1. Sponsor Situation * 2. Target Situation * 3. Surrogate Situation * C. Analysis * 1. Hezbollah Through The Lens Of The Hypotheses * 2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 * 3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 * 4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 * 5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 * D. Conclusion * Chapter V - Italy Case Study * A. Introduction * B. Historical Overview * 1. Target Situation * 2. Sponsor Situation * 3. Surrogate Situation * C. Analysis * 1. Italy Case Through The Lens Of The Hypotheses * 2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 * 3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 * 4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 * 5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 * D. Conclusion * Chapter Vi - Conclusion * A. Case Study Analysis And Findings * 1. Indonesia * 2. Chile * 3. Hezbollah * 4. Italy * B. Conclusions Derived From The Research Question And Main Hypothesis * C. Conclusions Derived From Supporting Hypotheses * D. Recommendations * E. Concluding Comments