A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government
Cover of the book A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book FAA National Aviation Research Plan, Portfolio of Goals, Destination 2025, Flight Plan Program: National Airspace System, NextGen, Air Traffic, Human Protection, Crash Safety, Aviation Weather by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Scout Sniping Field Manual - FMFM 1-3B (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2013 Complete Guide to MERS-CoV, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus: Serious Emerging Threat Related to SARS, Clinical Management, Prevention and Control, Official Guidelines by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment - China, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia - Territorial Disputes, Senkaku Islands, Economic Development, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Future Counterland Operations: Common Lessons from Three Conflicts - Persian Gulf War Desert Storm, Allied Force NATO in Yugoslavia, Enduring Freedom Afghanistan, Value of ISR, Power of Innovation by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Behcet's Disease Sourcebook: Clinical Data for Patients, Families, and Physicians - Diagnosis, Testing, Treatment, Drugs, Uveitis, Vasculitis and Related Autoimmune Diseases by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Examining Cyber Command Structures - History of Air and Space Domains, Nuclear Weapons Mission, Alternative Force Structures for Cyber Command and Control (C2), USCYBERCOM by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Security Cooperation: An Old Practice for New Times - National Security, Defense, Military Strategies, Africa Command AFRICOM, Southern Command SOUTHCOM, Section 1206 by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Lost Art of Air Superiority: U.S. Pursuit Aviation, 1919 to 1941 - Battle with the Bombers, Defending Pursuit, Preparation for War, World War II, P-40 Tommy Hawk, Major General Arnold, Air Corps by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare - Defeating Adversaries, Cognitive Demands, Integrating Intuition and Reasoning, Battle Wisdom from Firepower to Brainpower by Progressive Management
Cover of the book NASA Lunar Science Institute (NLSI) Reports - Research into Polar Water, Dust and Atmosphere, Moon Origin and Evolution, Astrophysics, Training and Outreach by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Not All Reforms Are Big: The Development of the Field Staff during the Root Era Reforms: Professionalism in Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuban and Philippine Campaign, Pershing’s Punitive Expedition by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program - Volume VII: Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo - Political and Engineering Insights by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Project Gemini Summary Conference: Comprehensive Overview of All Aspects of the Second American Manned Space Flight Program Leading to the Apollo Lunar Landing Missions - Operations, Missions, Science by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Gangs and Crime in America: Mara Salvatrucha Street Gang: International Criminal Enterprise with Roots in El Salvador's Civil War - Cliques in the U.S., Organization, Membership, Violence, Rivalries by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy