A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government
Cover of the book A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book 2012 Essential Guide to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) - SEALS, Army Rangers, Milestones, Aircraft, Weapons, UAS, Maritime Surface Platforms, Missions, Strategic Plan, Factbooks by Progressive Management
Cover of the book National Hurricane Operations Plan (FCM-P12-2013) - Weather Service Products, Aircraft Reconnaissance, Satellite Surveillance, Surface Radar Reporting, Data Buoys, Marine Broadcasts by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2011 Complete Guide to Bahrain: Bahraini Government, Military, Human and Religious Rights, History, Trade, Exports, Economy - Authoritative Coverage by Progressive Management
Cover of the book NASA Human Spaceflight Astronaut Health Research for Exploration and Manned Mars Missions, Risk Report WSN-05, EVA Spacewalk Injury, Orthostatic Intolerance, Hypobaric Hypoxia, Lunar Dust Exposure by Progressive Management
Cover of the book NIOSH Nanotechnology Safety: Safe Nanotechnology in the Workplace, Workers Exposed to Engineered Nanoparticles, Health and Safety Concerns Research by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Strategic Aggression: Conditions That Could Trigger Aggressive Military Action by the People's Republic of China (PRC) - Case Studies of Interwar Germany, Modern China, Secrecy, PLA, Communist Party by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wind Energy Multiyear Program Plan Through 2012: U.S. Department of Energy Programs for Large Wind, Systems Integration, Distributed Wind, Research and Development by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Technology Strategy in Irregular Warfare: High-Tech Versus Right-Tech - Unconventional Warfare, Special Operations, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Britain, and America, Aircraft, Artillery by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations - Mistakes and Failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Strategic Themes and Recommendations by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Effect of Everyday Corruption on the Russian View of Their Political Leadership: Russian Public Opinion and Personalist Autocracy Regime Support of Vladimir Putin Assessed by Unique Survey Data by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative - President George H. W. Bush, Quayle, Truly, NASA's 90-Day Study, Washington Space Policy Power Struggle over the Moon - Mars Program by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Army Theater Missile Defense Operations (FM 100-12) Ballistic and Cruise Missiles (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Marine Communications in Desert Shield and Desert Storm: U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf 1990-1991, Gulf War, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, CentCom, Air Control, Ground Campaign, Schwarzkopf by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Russian Arctic Strategy: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bureaucratic Politics - Global Warming Opening Oil, Hydrocarbon, Energy and Transport Rewards, Role of the Siloviki Bloc by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 20th Century Spy in the Sky Satellites: Secrets of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Volume 9 - National Reconnaissance Commentaries and Reviews by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy