A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government
Cover of the book A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis - Cognitive and Perceptual Biases, Reasoning Processes by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781465891532
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: March 9, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

Using the analytic techniques contained in this primer will assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of adversaries and other foreign actors is challenging, especially when either or both are concealed. Moreover, transnational threats today pose even greater complexity, in that they involve multiple actors—including nonstate entities—that can adapt and transform themselves faster than those who seek to monitor and contain them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, interactive systems such as financial flows, regional economies or the international system as a whole are in flux.

The first hurdle for analysts is identifying the relevant and diagnostic information from the increasing volume of ambiguous and contradictory data that is acquired through open source and clandestine means. Analysts must also pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and nonstate actors use to mislead. A systematic approach that considers a range of alternative explanations and outcomes offers one way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss potentially relevant hypotheses and supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn.

Cognitive and perceptual biases in human perception and judgment are another important reason for analysts to consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer and others have argued, all individuals assimilate and evaluate information through the medium of "mental models" (sometimes also called "frames" or "mind-sets"). These are experience-based constructs of assumptions and expectations both about the world in general and more specific domains. These constructs strongly influence what information analysts will accept—that is, data that are in accordance with analysts' unconscious mental models are more likely to be perceived and remembered than information that is at odds with them.

Mental models are critical to allowing individuals to process what otherwise would be an incomprehensible volume of information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important incoming or missing information that is not in accord with their assumptions and expectations. Seasoned analysts may be more susceptible to these mind-set problems as a result of their expertise and past success in using time-tested mental models. The key risks of mindsets are that: analysts perceive what they expect to perceive; once formed, they are resistant to change; new information is assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into existing mental models; and conflicting information is often dismissed or ignored. Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Counterintelligence (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book United States Counterterrorism Strategy in the Trans-Sahara and the Rise of Salafi-Jihadism in the Sahel: Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania, Boko Haram, Ansaru, AQIM, Ansar Al-Dine, Mujao, Al-Qaeda by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Impact of Training and Equipment at the Battle of Attu, Aleutian Campaign: Historical Study and Current Perspective - Unprepared and Ill-equipped World War II Cold Weather Debacle, Arctic Lessons by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Documents: Camp Planning for Displaced Persons (Air Force Handbook 10-222) - Safety, Gender Considerations, USAID, Humanitarian Relief, NGOs, Multinational Forces by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Paramilitary Organizations in Germany from 1871-1945: Stormtroopers, Freikorps, Treaty of Versailles, Landesjaegerkorps, Nazis, Third Riech, Hitler Youth, Waffen SS, Himmler, Holocaust by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Revolutionary War (War of American Independence): United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, from Colonial Militia to the Continental Army in the American Revolution, Valley Forge, Yorktown by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Europe's Dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and Recommendations for a Long-term Strategy, Putin, Politics, and Gazprom, Ukraine, Diversification Options by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Cruise Missiles for the U. S. Navy: An Exemplar of Innovation in a Military Organization - Sperry's Aerial Torpedo, Project Aphrodite, Gorgon Missile, Drones, Regulus, Harpoon, Tomahawk by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Future of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Force in the Russian Nuclear Triad: SSBN Force, Delta, Typhoon, Borey Subs, ICBM and Cruise Missile Competition, ALCM, Topol, Bombers, Bear, Blackjack by Progressive Management
Cover of the book NASA Space Technology Report: Lunar Destination Activities, Human Spaceflight Architecture Team, Moon Surface Duration, Mobility Range, Energy Sources, Potential Missions to the Moon by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Cyber Security Planning Guide, Small Business Information Security Fundamentals: Privacy and Data Security, Scams and Fraud, Network Security, Website Security, Email, Mobile Devices, Employees by Progressive Management
Cover of the book National Defense Intelligence College Paper: Sensemaking - A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution, Mindfulness, Macrocognition, Tame and Wicked Problems, Meliorists, Neuroscience by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2013 National Gang Report: Street, Prison, Outlaw Motorcycle, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, Weapons, Explosives, Eme, Mexican Mafia, Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, OMG, BCF, Los Zetas, Pagans by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wildland Fire in Ecosystems: Effects of Fire on Cultural Resources and Archaeology (Rainbow Series) Part 3 - Effects on Prehistoric Ceramics, Stone Artifacts, Rock Images, Fire Behavior and Effects by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Civil Affairs (CA) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - Field Manual 3-05.401, MCRP 3-33.1A - Humanitarian, Emergency Services (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy