Yemen: Comparative Insurgency and Counterinsurgency - al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Huthi Movement, Hirak, Tribal Elements, Sanaa, Could Yemen Become the Next Somalia Safe Haven for Terror

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique study examines why Yemen's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices have been less effective against the Huthi movement compared to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? This paper finds that the military's poor counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies, the international effort to combat AQAP, the Huthi's ability to recruit and mobilize large numbers of followers, and the Huthi leadership's pragmatic alliances gave the Huthis the advantage over AQAP and the Republic of Yemen.

Yemen faces multiple security problems. Foremost, the country faces threats from various groups including the Huthi Movement, AQAP, Hirak, and tribal elements with the Huthis recently capturing Sanaa. The country's oil supply will soon to run out, which is the main source of government revenue. The country is still in the process of transition required by the Gulf Cooperation Council-negotiated agreement after the Arab Spring. These problems are exacerbated by corruption, social, and economic problems. Finally, state failure remains a real possibility, with the various groups battling for control. In this case, Yemen could become the next Somalia. The worse scenario for the U.S. would for Yemen to become a safe haven for a group intent on attacking U.S. citizens and interests.

CHAPTER I * INTRODUCTION * A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION * B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * D. THESIS * E. RESEARCH DESIGN * F. THESIS OVERVIEW * CHAPTER II * BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENTS IN YEMEN * A. INTRODUCTION * B. HUTHI MOVEMENT * 1. Origins and Ideologies * 2. Political Opportunity Structures * 3. Mobilizing Structures * 4. Cultural Framing * 5. Conclusion * C. AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA * 1. Origins and Ideologies * 2. Political Opportunity Structures * 3. Mobilizing Structures * 4. Cultural Framing * 5. Conclusion * D. CONCLUSION / ANALYSIS * CHAPTER III * COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN * A. INTRODUCTION * B. STRATEGY AND LEGISLATION * 1. Strategy * a. Decapitation * b. Negotiations * c. Success or Failure * d. Repression * e. Reorientation * 2. Legislation * C. COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES AND MEASURES IN YEMEN * 1. Organizational Framework * 2. COIN/CT Resources * 3. COIN/CT Implementation * D. PUBLIC SUPPORT IN YEMEN * 1. Political Situation in Yemen * 2. Economic and Social Situation * 3. Analysis of Public Opinion * E. CONCLUSION/ANALYSIS * CHAPTER IV * EFFECTIVENESS OF INSURGENCIES * A. INTRODUCTION * B. HUTHI MOVEMENT * 1. Strategies and Developments * 2. Organization and Resources * 3. Recruitment and Popular Support * 4. International Support * 5. Territorial Gains and Losses * C. AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA * 1. Strategies and Developments * 2. Organization and Resources * 3. Recruitment and Popular Support * 4. International Support * 5. Territorial Gains and Losses * D. CONCLUSION * CHAPTER V * INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR YEMEN * COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES * A. INTRODUCTION * B. SAUDI ARABIAN SUPPORT FOR YEMEN COIN/CT * C. U.S. SUPPORT FOR YEMEN COIN/CT * D. OTHER COUNTRIES - JORDAN AND QATAR * E. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER VI * CONCLUSION * A. RECRUITING AND MOBILIZING SUPPORTERS * B. EFFECTIVENESS OF YEMENI GOVERNMENT POLICIES * C. EFFECTIVENESS OF HUTHI AND AL QAEDA INSURGENCIES * D. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT, THE HUTHIS AND AQAP * E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS