The Relativistic Brain

How it works and why it cannot be simulated by a Turing Machine

In addition to disclosing a new brain theory, we also

present in this monograph a series of arguments to counter the

hypothesis, known as computationalism, that complex brains like

ours resemble digital computers and, as such, could be

reproduced or simulated by software running in a sophisticated

supercomputer. For quite some time now, many computer

scientists involved in artificial intelligence research have argued

that most, if not all, complex functions generated by animal

brains, including our own, will soon be effectively simulated by

algorithms running on digital computers. Such a proposition is

not completely new, since similar claims have been made since

the days of Georges Boole and Alan Turing. Today, this

computationalism view states that since the brain is a physical

entity, it must obey the laws of physics which can be simulated

on a digital computer.