The Influence Of British Operational Intelligence On The War At Sea In The Mediterranean June 1940 - November 1942

Nonfiction, History, Germany, European General, Military, United States
Cover of the book The Influence Of British Operational Intelligence On The War At Sea In The Mediterranean June 1940 - November 1942 by Lieutenant Commander Mark E. Stille, Lucknow Books
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Author: Lieutenant Commander Mark E. Stille ISBN: 9781782898245
Publisher: Lucknow Books Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Lucknow Books Language: English
Author: Lieutenant Commander Mark E. Stille
ISBN: 9781782898245
Publisher: Lucknow Books
Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Lucknow Books
Language: English

Intelligence derived from a number of sources, primarily the decryption of high-level German and Italian communications, provided British forces in the Mediterranean with extraordinary insights into Axis naval operations. This level of intelligence was instrumental to the success of British forces during most of the decisive points during the naval war in the Mediterranean and indirectly had great influence on the ground war in North Africa. Many of the hallmarks of the nature in which operational intelligence was used retains relevance for today’s operational commander. These include use of intelligence to identify and attack enemy centers of gravity, the importance of incorporating intelligence into the planning process, use of intelligence as a force multiplier but not as a force substitute, and the dissemination and handling of sensitive intelligence.

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Intelligence derived from a number of sources, primarily the decryption of high-level German and Italian communications, provided British forces in the Mediterranean with extraordinary insights into Axis naval operations. This level of intelligence was instrumental to the success of British forces during most of the decisive points during the naval war in the Mediterranean and indirectly had great influence on the ground war in North Africa. Many of the hallmarks of the nature in which operational intelligence was used retains relevance for today’s operational commander. These include use of intelligence to identify and attack enemy centers of gravity, the importance of incorporating intelligence into the planning process, use of intelligence as a force multiplier but not as a force substitute, and the dissemination and handling of sensitive intelligence.

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