The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia: AQAP, al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula, East Riyadh Bombing, al-Nashiri

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science
Cover of the book The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia: AQAP, al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula, East Riyadh Bombing, al-Nashiri by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
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Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781301798384
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: February 21, 2013
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781301798384
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: February 21, 2013
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This paper traces and assesses al-Qa'ida's efforts to launch an insurgency in Saudi Arabia from the mid-1990s until today. It examines the background of Usama bin Ladin's 1996 declaration of jihad, al-Qa'ida's activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2002, and the causes and evolution of the campaign waged by the group "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) from 2003 to 2006.

The paper argues that despite the widespread view of Saudi Arabia as "al-Qa'ida country," and despite the recent developments in Yemen, the jihad in Saudi Arabia has failed so far. The late 1990s saw no operations in the Kingdom because Bin Ladin's infrastructure there was too weak. The AQAP campaign, made possible by the massive influx in 2002 of al-Qa'ida members from Afghanistan, petered out in 2006. Today, practically nothing remains of the original AQAP organization,. Nevertheless, its legacy and propaganda continues to inspire amateur cells, and al-Qa'ida in Yemen is actively planning operations in the Kingdom.

The Saudi jihad failed because it lacked popular support. From his exile in Sudan and Afghanistan, Bin Ladin overestimated popular resentment of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and underestimated the Saudi public's aversion to domestic unrest. The violence in 2003 and 2004 was the exception that proved the rule. AQAP represented an alien element on the Saudi Islamist scene. Most of its militants had gone through the peculiar socialization processes of al-Qa'ida's Afghan training camps. The launch of the campaign in 2003 was the result of a momentary discrepancy between the very high organizational capability of returnees from Afghanistan, and the weakness of the Saudi intelligence apparatus. That gap has since been closed. Today, country-wide, organized political activism of any kind is more difficult than ever before.
In addition to the lack of popular support and the coercive power of the state, al-Qa'ida's efforts suffered from an ideological split in the Kingdom's militant Islamist community.

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This paper traces and assesses al-Qa'ida's efforts to launch an insurgency in Saudi Arabia from the mid-1990s until today. It examines the background of Usama bin Ladin's 1996 declaration of jihad, al-Qa'ida's activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2002, and the causes and evolution of the campaign waged by the group "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) from 2003 to 2006.

The paper argues that despite the widespread view of Saudi Arabia as "al-Qa'ida country," and despite the recent developments in Yemen, the jihad in Saudi Arabia has failed so far. The late 1990s saw no operations in the Kingdom because Bin Ladin's infrastructure there was too weak. The AQAP campaign, made possible by the massive influx in 2002 of al-Qa'ida members from Afghanistan, petered out in 2006. Today, practically nothing remains of the original AQAP organization,. Nevertheless, its legacy and propaganda continues to inspire amateur cells, and al-Qa'ida in Yemen is actively planning operations in the Kingdom.

The Saudi jihad failed because it lacked popular support. From his exile in Sudan and Afghanistan, Bin Ladin overestimated popular resentment of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and underestimated the Saudi public's aversion to domestic unrest. The violence in 2003 and 2004 was the exception that proved the rule. AQAP represented an alien element on the Saudi Islamist scene. Most of its militants had gone through the peculiar socialization processes of al-Qa'ida's Afghan training camps. The launch of the campaign in 2003 was the result of a momentary discrepancy between the very high organizational capability of returnees from Afghanistan, and the weakness of the Saudi intelligence apparatus. That gap has since been closed. Today, country-wide, organized political activism of any kind is more difficult than ever before.
In addition to the lack of popular support and the coercive power of the state, al-Qa'ida's efforts suffered from an ideological split in the Kingdom's militant Islamist community.

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