Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914

Governments versus Bankers

Business & Finance, Economics, Public Finance, Economic History
Cover of the book Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914 by Leonardo Weller, Springer International Publishing
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Author: Leonardo Weller ISBN: 9783319736334
Publisher: Springer International Publishing Publication: April 20, 2018
Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan Language: English
Author: Leonardo Weller
ISBN: 9783319736334
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Publication: April 20, 2018
Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan
Language: English

This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. 

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This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. 

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