| Author: | Charles Edward Callwell | ISBN: | 9781623580575 |
| Publisher: | Tales End Press | Publication: | August 12, 2012 |
| Imprint: | Language: | English |
| Author: | Charles Edward Callwell |
| ISBN: | 9781623580575 |
| Publisher: | Tales End Press |
| Publication: | August 12, 2012 |
| Imprint: | |
| Language: | English |
This is the original manual for “small wars,” now known variously as guerrilla warfare, asymmetric combat, and low-intensity conflict. It was first published in 1896 as an analysis and how-to guide for the British Army as it fought to expand the boundaries of the British Empire. Its author, Major General Sir Charles Edward Callwell, collects and distills combat experience from a vast range of British, French, and Russian imperial campaigns and rebellions. Callwell then draws several universal small-war combat lessons that are still true today, including the need for “boldness and vigor” to keep irregular forces off-balance, the vital role of intelligence, the importance of seizing and holding important terrain (most often the high ground), and the final war-winning requirement to “seize what the enemy prizes most.” He also shows that technological superiority alone is not enough, and that logistics and supply can lock an army in place instead of freeing it. Some of the Afghanistan battlefields described in the book are still being fought over today, with much the same disparity in forces, over a century later – it is impossible to miss the lessons of history in this classic work.
Table of Contents:
• I. Introduction.
• II. Causes of Small wars as affecting their Conditions.
• III. The Objective in Small Wars.
• IV. The Influence of Sea Power.
• V. Difficulties under which the Regular Forces labour as regards Intelligence.
• VI. The Influence of the Question of Supply upon Small Wars.
• VII. Boldness and Vigour the Essence of effectively conducting such Operations.
• VII. Tactics favour the Regular Army while Strategy favours the Enemy.
• IX. To avoid desultory Warfare the Enemy must be brought to battle.
• X. Division of Force.
• XI. Lines of Communications.
• XII. Guerilla Warfare in General.
• XIII. Introductory Remarks with regard to Tactical Condition
• XIV. Tactics of Attack.
• XV. Tactics of Defence.
• XVI. Pursuits and Retreats.
• XVII. The employment of Feints.
• XVIII. Surprises, Raids, and Ambuscades.
• XIX. Squares on the March, in Bivouac, and in Action.
• XX. Principles of Laager and Zeriba Warfare.
• XXI. Hill Warfare.
• XXII. Bush Warfare.
• XXIII. Infantry Tactics.
• XXIV. Cavalry and Mounted Infantry.
• XXV. Camel Corps.
• XXVI. Artillery Tactics.
• XXVII. Machine Guns.
• XXVIII. The Service of Security.
• XXIX. Night Operations.
• XXX. Defence Works.
This is the original manual for “small wars,” now known variously as guerrilla warfare, asymmetric combat, and low-intensity conflict. It was first published in 1896 as an analysis and how-to guide for the British Army as it fought to expand the boundaries of the British Empire. Its author, Major General Sir Charles Edward Callwell, collects and distills combat experience from a vast range of British, French, and Russian imperial campaigns and rebellions. Callwell then draws several universal small-war combat lessons that are still true today, including the need for “boldness and vigor” to keep irregular forces off-balance, the vital role of intelligence, the importance of seizing and holding important terrain (most often the high ground), and the final war-winning requirement to “seize what the enemy prizes most.” He also shows that technological superiority alone is not enough, and that logistics and supply can lock an army in place instead of freeing it. Some of the Afghanistan battlefields described in the book are still being fought over today, with much the same disparity in forces, over a century later – it is impossible to miss the lessons of history in this classic work.
Table of Contents:
• I. Introduction.
• II. Causes of Small wars as affecting their Conditions.
• III. The Objective in Small Wars.
• IV. The Influence of Sea Power.
• V. Difficulties under which the Regular Forces labour as regards Intelligence.
• VI. The Influence of the Question of Supply upon Small Wars.
• VII. Boldness and Vigour the Essence of effectively conducting such Operations.
• VII. Tactics favour the Regular Army while Strategy favours the Enemy.
• IX. To avoid desultory Warfare the Enemy must be brought to battle.
• X. Division of Force.
• XI. Lines of Communications.
• XII. Guerilla Warfare in General.
• XIII. Introductory Remarks with regard to Tactical Condition
• XIV. Tactics of Attack.
• XV. Tactics of Defence.
• XVI. Pursuits and Retreats.
• XVII. The employment of Feints.
• XVIII. Surprises, Raids, and Ambuscades.
• XIX. Squares on the March, in Bivouac, and in Action.
• XX. Principles of Laager and Zeriba Warfare.
• XXI. Hill Warfare.
• XXII. Bush Warfare.
• XXIII. Infantry Tactics.
• XXIV. Cavalry and Mounted Infantry.
• XXV. Camel Corps.
• XXVI. Artillery Tactics.
• XXVII. Machine Guns.
• XXVIII. The Service of Security.
• XXIX. Night Operations.
• XXX. Defence Works.
