Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781301440795 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | February 16, 2013 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
Author: | Progressive Management |
ISBN: | 9781301440795 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management |
Publication: | February 16, 2013 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
Language: | English |
Numerous studies have focused on American airpower, particularly since it became a dominant force in modern warfare. Yet, only a handful of these studies have offered a critical evaluation of air leadership, and even fewer have shown a concern for the institutional dynamics that shape air leadership. Therefore, at least one study needs to ask, "Who are the air leaders and where have they come from?"
This analysis focuses on the career specialty of Air Force general officers who served between 1953 and 1973. It indicates the clear dominance by rated or flying officers (mainly pilots and a few navigators) within Air Force leadership. The issue here is not whether pilots should dominate the Air Force—the fact is they do. Rather, a more interesting phenomenon is that persons who sit on top of the world's most powerful air force are almost exclusively fighter pilots; yet, their institution and its doctrine were created before World War II by bomber pilots. This reality has caused some recent concern within the Air Force. Many nonfighter pilots seem concerned about their prospects for success within the institution. In August 1991 a popular underground "brown paper," titled "TAC-umcizing the Air Force: The Emerging Vision of the Future," was circulated around the air staff and the Air Force. This satirical essay about the dominant fighter culture concluded that "first, manly men [fighter pilots] must dominate Headquarters USAF. Second, they must command all Air Force major commands. Last, USAF must have a wing structure [favoring fighter units] which will grow and nurture the future leaders of the Air Force." The brown paper's popularity sparked a sequel by the same anonymous author in August 1992, titled "ACC [Air Combat Command] Back to the Future: The Second Coming of the Manly Man." In sum, the literature in Air Force newspapers and journals indicates this cultural issue still concerns many within the institution.
Chapter 1 - Formative Years in Total War * Chapter 2 - Marketing A Vision (1945-53) * Chapter 3 - Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948-57) * Chapter 4 - The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961-62) * Chapter 5 - Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963-65) * Chapter 6 - Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964-69) * Chapter 7 - The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965-72) * Chapter 8 - Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973-82) * Chapter 9 - Conclusion * Appendix A - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1960 * Appendix B - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1975 * Appendix C - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1982 * Appendix D - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1990 * Bibliography
Numerous studies have focused on American airpower, particularly since it became a dominant force in modern warfare. Yet, only a handful of these studies have offered a critical evaluation of air leadership, and even fewer have shown a concern for the institutional dynamics that shape air leadership. Therefore, at least one study needs to ask, "Who are the air leaders and where have they come from?"
This analysis focuses on the career specialty of Air Force general officers who served between 1953 and 1973. It indicates the clear dominance by rated or flying officers (mainly pilots and a few navigators) within Air Force leadership. The issue here is not whether pilots should dominate the Air Force—the fact is they do. Rather, a more interesting phenomenon is that persons who sit on top of the world's most powerful air force are almost exclusively fighter pilots; yet, their institution and its doctrine were created before World War II by bomber pilots. This reality has caused some recent concern within the Air Force. Many nonfighter pilots seem concerned about their prospects for success within the institution. In August 1991 a popular underground "brown paper," titled "TAC-umcizing the Air Force: The Emerging Vision of the Future," was circulated around the air staff and the Air Force. This satirical essay about the dominant fighter culture concluded that "first, manly men [fighter pilots] must dominate Headquarters USAF. Second, they must command all Air Force major commands. Last, USAF must have a wing structure [favoring fighter units] which will grow and nurture the future leaders of the Air Force." The brown paper's popularity sparked a sequel by the same anonymous author in August 1992, titled "ACC [Air Combat Command] Back to the Future: The Second Coming of the Manly Man." In sum, the literature in Air Force newspapers and journals indicates this cultural issue still concerns many within the institution.
Chapter 1 - Formative Years in Total War * Chapter 2 - Marketing A Vision (1945-53) * Chapter 3 - Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948-57) * Chapter 4 - The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961-62) * Chapter 5 - Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963-65) * Chapter 6 - Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964-69) * Chapter 7 - The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965-72) * Chapter 8 - Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973-82) * Chapter 9 - Conclusion * Appendix A - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1960 * Appendix B - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1975 * Appendix C - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1982 * Appendix D - Backgrounds of Air Force Senior Leaders 1990 * Bibliography