Political Transformations and Public Finances

Europe, 1650–1913

Business & Finance, Economics, Economic Development, Economic History
Cover of the book Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco, Cambridge University Press
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Author: Mark Dincecco ISBN: 9781139124591
Publisher: Cambridge University Press Publication: September 26, 2011
Imprint: Cambridge University Press Language: English
Author: Mark Dincecco
ISBN: 9781139124591
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication: September 26, 2011
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Language: English

How did today's rich states first establish modern fiscal systems? To answer this question, Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco examines the evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe over the long term. The book argues that the emergence of efficient fiscal institutions was the result of two fundamental political transformations that resolved long-standing problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. States gained tax force through fiscal centralization and restricted ruler power through parliamentary limits, which enabled them to gather large tax revenues and channel funds toward public services with positive economic benefits. Using a novel combination of descriptive, case study and statistical methods, the book pursues this argument through a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. The book's findings are significant for our understanding of economic history and have important consequences for current policy debates.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

How did today's rich states first establish modern fiscal systems? To answer this question, Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco examines the evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe over the long term. The book argues that the emergence of efficient fiscal institutions was the result of two fundamental political transformations that resolved long-standing problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. States gained tax force through fiscal centralization and restricted ruler power through parliamentary limits, which enabled them to gather large tax revenues and channel funds toward public services with positive economic benefits. Using a novel combination of descriptive, case study and statistical methods, the book pursues this argument through a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. The book's findings are significant for our understanding of economic history and have important consequences for current policy debates.

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