Operational Logic And Identifying Soviet Operational Centers Of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941

Nonfiction, History, Germany, European General, Military, United States
Cover of the book Operational Logic And Identifying Soviet Operational Centers Of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941 by Major David J. Bongi, Verdun Press
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Author: Major David J. Bongi ISBN: 9781786254047
Publisher: Verdun Press Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press Language: English
Author: Major David J. Bongi
ISBN: 9781786254047
Publisher: Verdun Press
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press
Language: English

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign.

The second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine.

Thus, the research question for this monograph is: Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity?

The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendel’s and Colonel Lamar Tooke’s analytical model called “Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.

This monograph concludes that Moscow was the operational center of gravity for the campaign by virtue of its direct and intrinsic relationship to the strategic center of gravity—the Soviet Military.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign.

The second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine.

Thus, the research question for this monograph is: Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity?

The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendel’s and Colonel Lamar Tooke’s analytical model called “Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.

This monograph concludes that Moscow was the operational center of gravity for the campaign by virtue of its direct and intrinsic relationship to the strategic center of gravity—the Soviet Military.

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