Managing Transitions: Examining the Institutional Army's Transformation following the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom – Flawed Doctrine Led to Mismanagement of FCS, Modularity, and ARFORGEN

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This study provides a comparative analysis of the US Army's post-Vietnam transformation with an examination of the Army's recent transformation during the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The research will identify those senior leaders whose constructive and positive civil-military relations enabled their service in managing transformation, which created agile and adaptive teams that were capable of adjusting to change. Additionally, effective transformation was built with sound doctrinal underpinning that informed the organizational structure and training initiatives that endured through the next war.

The results of this monograph will show that the senior leaders who managed the post-Vietnam transformation were more effective in managing the reform efforts than the leaders who managed the defense transformation efforts in the early part of the Twenty-first Century. The post-Vietnam reform was developed with a solid doctrinal underpinning that informed the organizational structure and training initiatives that endured through the duration of the transformation and were implemented during the next war. The initiatives were built in a mutually supporting manner, which reduced multiple adjustments and kept the cost down as the Army completed the transformation. In contrast, the defense transformation of 2003 contained dysfunctional civil-military relations that consisted of micromanagement and an over-reliance to transform at all cost. In that environment, the Army failed to refine the capabilities-based network-centric doctrine to reflect the changing nature of war in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The flawed doctrine contributed to the continued investment and mismanagement of reforms like Future Combat System (FCS), Modularity and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). The impact of the mismanagement of the recent transformation led to the Army paying a 400 percent increase in readiness and a loss of $480 billion dollars from FCS cancellations, and oscillations of force structure within the modular design.