Joint Force Cyberspace Component Command: Establishing Cyberspace Operations Unity of Effort for the Joint Force Commander – Cyberwar, Air Power Development in Operation Desert Storm

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Whether purposefully or out of sheer coincidence, cyberspace operations have chartered a course strikingly similar to that of air operations in history, theory, and doctrine. Both grew out of scientific innovation, theorists were quick to apply both of the new technologies to the art of warfare, and the doctrine for application of the military power associated with both of the new technologies evolved with scientific developments. However, the two have diverged as the United States military begins development of Cyber Mission Forces. As these forces grow and become available to a Joint Force Commander, he must establish a structure to unify the various offensive, defensive, and security operations in his cyberspace.

During Operation Desert Storm, the Commander United States Central Command unified air operations efforts through a Joint Force Air Component Command. This concept grew out of the experiences of the United States Air Forces beginning with the First World War and evolved with each subsequent application of air power. Current Cyberspace Operations doctrine lacks the guidance for achieving a unity of effort. Cyberspace theorists and doctrine writers would do well to continue to follow air power's historical example and develop a Joint Force Cyberspace Component Command to achieve unity of effort for Cyberspace Operations.

Scholars have identified ten revolutions in military affairs beginning in fourteenth-century England and occurring at sea, in the air, space, and most recently in the information environment today. Revolutions in military affairs occur when a group or nation combines technological innovation, with new organizational, doctrinal, and tactical concepts to attain a position of relative advantage over a competing organization. The lesser organization must then adapt similarly if they wish to remain a strategic peer. According to Steven Metz and James Kievit, "a revolution in military affairs dramatically increases combat effectiveness by four types of simultaneous and mutually supportive change: technological change; systems development; operational innovation; and, organizational adaptation."