How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict

Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, International, International Relations, Politics, History & Theory
Cover of the book How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict by Clayton L. Thyne, Lexington Books
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Clayton L. Thyne ISBN: 9780739135488
Publisher: Lexington Books Publication: September 24, 2009
Imprint: Lexington Books Language: English
Author: Clayton L. Thyne
ISBN: 9780739135488
Publisher: Lexington Books
Publication: September 24, 2009
Imprint: Lexington Books
Language: English

Given the appalling consequences of civil wars, why are the competing actors within a state unable to come to a settlement to avoid the costs of conflict? How might external parties affect the likelihood that a civil war begins? How do their actions affect the duration and outcome of civil conflicts that are already underway? How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict draws on three main approaches_bargaining theory, signaling theory, and rational expectations_to examine how external actors might affect the onset, duration and outcome of civil wars. Signals from external actors are important because they represent a potential increase (or decrease) in fighting capabilities for the government or the opposition if a war were to begin. Costly signals should not affect the probability of civil war onset because they are readily observable ex ante, which allows the government and opposition to peacefully adjust their bargaining positions based on changes in relative capabilities. In contrast, cheap hostile signals make civil war more likely by increasing the risk that an opposition group overestimates its ability to stage a successful rebellion with external support. Cheap supportive signals work in the opposite manner because they represent increased fighting capabilities for the government. Furthermore, signals sent in the pre-war period have important implications for the duration and outcome of civil conflicts because competing intrastate actors develop expectations for future interventions prior to deciding to fight. In this book, Clayton L. Thyne tests this theory by examining the likelihood of civil war onset, the duration, and the outcome of all civil wars since 1945, finding strong support from empirical tests for each component of this theory. The conclusion offers specific advice to US policy-makers to prevent the outbreak of civil conflict in states most at-risk for civil war and to help end those that are currently underway. This book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students and scholars interested in political science, international studies, conflict resolution, and peace science.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Given the appalling consequences of civil wars, why are the competing actors within a state unable to come to a settlement to avoid the costs of conflict? How might external parties affect the likelihood that a civil war begins? How do their actions affect the duration and outcome of civil conflicts that are already underway? How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict draws on three main approaches_bargaining theory, signaling theory, and rational expectations_to examine how external actors might affect the onset, duration and outcome of civil wars. Signals from external actors are important because they represent a potential increase (or decrease) in fighting capabilities for the government or the opposition if a war were to begin. Costly signals should not affect the probability of civil war onset because they are readily observable ex ante, which allows the government and opposition to peacefully adjust their bargaining positions based on changes in relative capabilities. In contrast, cheap hostile signals make civil war more likely by increasing the risk that an opposition group overestimates its ability to stage a successful rebellion with external support. Cheap supportive signals work in the opposite manner because they represent increased fighting capabilities for the government. Furthermore, signals sent in the pre-war period have important implications for the duration and outcome of civil conflicts because competing intrastate actors develop expectations for future interventions prior to deciding to fight. In this book, Clayton L. Thyne tests this theory by examining the likelihood of civil war onset, the duration, and the outcome of all civil wars since 1945, finding strong support from empirical tests for each component of this theory. The conclusion offers specific advice to US policy-makers to prevent the outbreak of civil conflict in states most at-risk for civil war and to help end those that are currently underway. This book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students and scholars interested in political science, international studies, conflict resolution, and peace science.

More books from Lexington Books

Cover of the book New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Noticing Oral Corrective Feedback in the Second Language Classroom by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Political Poetry as Discourse by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Race and Gender in the Classroom by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Rome and the Spirit of Caesar by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book The Bonin Islanders, 1830 to the Present by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Stalin's Legacy in Romania by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Art and Ritual in the Black Diaspora by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book The Kaprálová Companion by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Screaming for Change by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Whatever Happened to Class? by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Water Capitalism by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Yoga, the Body, and Embodied Social Change by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Japan in the World by Clayton L. Thyne
Cover of the book Primetime Pundits by Clayton L. Thyne
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy