End State: Relevant in Stability Operations? Operations Other than War (OOTW), Case Studies of Bosnia, Kosovo, Improvements to Army and Joint Doctrine, Strategy, Operational Planning

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the war on terrorism progresses, it appears stability operations may continue to be the logical follow-on phase after intervention into each failed state. There is a necessity for military forces in the post-conflict environment to keep the peace while the failed state rebuilds. Already, there are approximately 71,000 U.S. military personnel committed to such operations around the world. Interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Macedonia are recent examples of America's commitment to end violence, end suffering, and provide humanitarian support. American military forces have been involved with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina for over six years. Operations in Kosovo indicate a similar path with no end in sight.

A review of western military literature indicates a plethora of information on end state as it relates to war. Despite an extensive history in stability operations, there is a void on the role of end state. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if end state is a relevant construct for the campaign planning of stability operations, specifically, peace operations.

As globalization spreads, international pressure and economic necessity have resulted in U.S. intervention numerous times in the past decade. While a bipolar world afforded a sense of certainty, the known threat of communism, the multipolar environment is characterized by uncertainty and complexity. As the United States continues to become engaged in peace operations, it is imperative to understand the implementation of end states. Peace operations cannot become unending commitments and tie up precious resources. Piecemeal commitment of American military forces around the globe affects readiness.

From the theoretical perspective, the author examines goal setting, problem solving, and the role of intent. From the historical perspective, two case studies, Bosnia and Kosovo, are evaluated to assess the role of end state in planning. The monograph includes recommendations to improve both Army and joint doctrine in order to minimize confusion over the development of an end state. Recommendations are in the areas of strategy, doctrine, operational planning, civil-military relationship, and force planning and readiness. The author concludes that planning without a start point, a goal or end state, is flawed. When developing campaign plans, operational commanders cannot lose sight of the importance of an end state. However, the military alone cannot achieve an end state in peace operations. Success requires a campaign plan that integrates all instruments of national power. Only then is the term end state a relevant construct.

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION * OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) DEFINED * BACKGROUND OF U.S. OOTW * STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT * RELEVANCE OF END STATE * METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA * CHAPTER TWO - DEFINITION OF TERMS * BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONAL ART * CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN * DOCTRINAL REVIEW * JOINT DOCTRINE * ARMY * AIR FORCE * NAVY * MARINE CORPS * SUMMARY * CHAPTER THREE - GOAL SETTING AND PROBLEM SOLVING * ROLE OF INTENT * SUMMARY * CHAPTER FOUR - BOSNIA * BACKGROUND * STRATEGIC GUIDANCE * OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS * SUMMARY * CHAPTER FIVE - KOSOVO * BACKGROUND * STRATEGIC GUIDANCE * OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS * SUMMARY * CHAPTER SIX - RECOMMENDATIONS * STRATEGY * DOCTRINE * PLANNING * CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP * FORCE STRUCTURE AND READINESS * SUMMARY * CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION * BIBLIOGRAPHY * BOOKS * PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES * GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS * THESES, MONOGRAPHS, AND UNPUBLISHED WORKS