Deep Battle In World War I: The British 1918 Offensive In Palestine

Nonfiction, History, Military, World War I, Germany, British
Cover of the book Deep Battle In World War I: The British 1918 Offensive In Palestine by LCDR Paul A. Povlock USN, Verdun Press
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Author: LCDR Paul A. Povlock USN ISBN: 9781786250230
Publisher: Verdun Press Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press Language: English
Author: LCDR Paul A. Povlock USN
ISBN: 9781786250230
Publisher: Verdun Press
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press
Language: English

Maneuver Warfare Theory achieved major acceptance during the 1980’s, emphasizing the conduct of simultaneous offensive operations throughout the depth of the battlefield. With the victory of Coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM, the “deep battle” theory gained instant credibility and the emphasis on “joint” operations reached a fever pitch. Yet, too often analysts have only used the war in Kuwait to prove or refute these operational concepts. All theories require more than one case study to validate or nullify their precepts. Other historical examples need to be examined using the model of maneuver warfare to give greater support for this theory.

While the First World War is often characterized by the futile attrition of the Western Front in France, many exceptional operational offensives were also conducted. The British September 1918 offensive in Palestine is a superb example of the proper application of combat forces at the operational level. General Edmund Allenby’s use of regular army units, armored cars, cavalry, airpower and irregulars led to a major victory that hastened the collapse of Turkey and the Central Powers. Long before mechanized forces and maneuver theory had been developed, British Imperial forces executed an operational design stressing many elements of deep battle theory.

By examining the British offensive using the paradigm of maneuver warfare, additional evidence can be generated to add credence to the theory. The importance of the synergistic effect of combat arms when applied jointly is also shown. Maneuver theory must be better understood if this paradigm is used to create doctrine for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

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Maneuver Warfare Theory achieved major acceptance during the 1980’s, emphasizing the conduct of simultaneous offensive operations throughout the depth of the battlefield. With the victory of Coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM, the “deep battle” theory gained instant credibility and the emphasis on “joint” operations reached a fever pitch. Yet, too often analysts have only used the war in Kuwait to prove or refute these operational concepts. All theories require more than one case study to validate or nullify their precepts. Other historical examples need to be examined using the model of maneuver warfare to give greater support for this theory.

While the First World War is often characterized by the futile attrition of the Western Front in France, many exceptional operational offensives were also conducted. The British September 1918 offensive in Palestine is a superb example of the proper application of combat forces at the operational level. General Edmund Allenby’s use of regular army units, armored cars, cavalry, airpower and irregulars led to a major victory that hastened the collapse of Turkey and the Central Powers. Long before mechanized forces and maneuver theory had been developed, British Imperial forces executed an operational design stressing many elements of deep battle theory.

By examining the British offensive using the paradigm of maneuver warfare, additional evidence can be generated to add credence to the theory. The importance of the synergistic effect of combat arms when applied jointly is also shown. Maneuver theory must be better understood if this paradigm is used to create doctrine for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

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