Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East - Historical Lessons on Nuclear Roll Forward and Rollback, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, NATO, Relevant Nuclear Agreements

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique staff report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee examines the factors that could motivate states of the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons.

Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - Historical Lessons on Nuclear ''Roll Forward'' and "Rollback" * Chapter 3 - Saudi Arabia * The Worst Case Scenario . * Saudi Perceptions of Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Program * The Saudi Nuclear Energy Program * Will the Saudi Seek a Nuclear Weapon? * Policy Considerations * Chapter 4 - Egypt * Egypt's Nuclear Power Program: Past and Present . * Egypt and Iran * Egypt and Nuclear Weapons * The Two Wild Cards * Policy Considerations * Chapter 5 - Turkey * Major Irritants in the United States-Turkey Relationship * Turkey and NATO * Turkey and Nuclear Weapons * Policy Considerations * Appendix 1: Status of Relevant Nuclear Agreements

U.S. decision-makers must seek to understand the regional dynamics that would accompany an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and be ready to implement policies to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the balance of power could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran's neighbors seek to redress the new power imbalance. This raises important questions: How are these three countries currently responding to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own?
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain staff's findings related to these questions. Each chapter touches on the respective country's relationship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state's response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report comes to the following conclusions for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.