An Aversion to Risk: A Warning From the Past: Comparison of 1862 American Civil War Peninsula Campaign with General McClellan to the 2003 Iraq War Failures, Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols, Petraeus

Nonfiction, History, Americas, United States, Civil War Period (1850-1877), Military
Cover of the book An Aversion to Risk: A Warning From the Past: Comparison of 1862 American Civil War Peninsula Campaign with General McClellan to the 2003 Iraq War Failures, Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols, Petraeus by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781311130600
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: October 30, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781311130600
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: October 30, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns, as uncertainty clouded the theaters, the common characteristic among leaders was their greater appreciation of what might be lost than what could be gained, and taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the U.S. to greater risks. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. There are obvious differences between then and now, but there is an unsettling similarity. The culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

CHAPTER 1 * Thesis * CHAPTER 2 * Context of the Peninsula Campaign * The Strategic Environment in 1862 * McClellan's Background * Geography * The Plan * CHAPTER 3 * Execution * Lincoln and Stanton * Goldsborough and Missroon * McClellan * CHAPTER 4 * Contemporary Example * CHAPTER 5 * Synthesis / Conclusion

On 4 April 1862, 35-year-old Major General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac stepped off from Fort Monroe, Virginia towards Richmond, Virginia; he did so with the largest army ever assembled in North America up to that time. It had 121,000 soldiers, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 74 ambulances, and 44 artillery batteries.1 A European advisor remarked that it resembled "the stride of a giant."2 Equally remarkable, 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges floated McClellan's army from the outskirts of Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe to establish its initial staging area.3 As one Confederate officer noted, "the thick clouds of trouble were gathering."4 McClellan's Army was four times the size of the Confederate force directly to his front, and backed by a nation possessing economic, technological, and demographic superiority over its opponent. Despite this tremendous combat power, McClellan's 1862 Peninsula Campaign ended in abject failure. The Army of the Potomac culminated eight miles from its intended objective, the Confederate capital of Richmond, even though it faced a weaker force commanded by an untried general. After six months and at the cost of 15,849 men,5 McClellan abandoned the campaign. The Army of the Potomac fell back to defend its own capital, and ultimately the Union interior itself, after the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run and subsequent invasion of Maryland. How, given so many advantages, did operational stalemate, followed by strategic crisis, result in so short a time?

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns, as uncertainty clouded the theaters, the common characteristic among leaders was their greater appreciation of what might be lost than what could be gained, and taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the U.S. to greater risks. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. There are obvious differences between then and now, but there is an unsettling similarity. The culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

CHAPTER 1 * Thesis * CHAPTER 2 * Context of the Peninsula Campaign * The Strategic Environment in 1862 * McClellan's Background * Geography * The Plan * CHAPTER 3 * Execution * Lincoln and Stanton * Goldsborough and Missroon * McClellan * CHAPTER 4 * Contemporary Example * CHAPTER 5 * Synthesis / Conclusion

On 4 April 1862, 35-year-old Major General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac stepped off from Fort Monroe, Virginia towards Richmond, Virginia; he did so with the largest army ever assembled in North America up to that time. It had 121,000 soldiers, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 74 ambulances, and 44 artillery batteries.1 A European advisor remarked that it resembled "the stride of a giant."2 Equally remarkable, 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges floated McClellan's army from the outskirts of Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe to establish its initial staging area.3 As one Confederate officer noted, "the thick clouds of trouble were gathering."4 McClellan's Army was four times the size of the Confederate force directly to his front, and backed by a nation possessing economic, technological, and demographic superiority over its opponent. Despite this tremendous combat power, McClellan's 1862 Peninsula Campaign ended in abject failure. The Army of the Potomac culminated eight miles from its intended objective, the Confederate capital of Richmond, even though it faced a weaker force commanded by an untried general. After six months and at the cost of 15,849 men,5 McClellan abandoned the campaign. The Army of the Potomac fell back to defend its own capital, and ultimately the Union interior itself, after the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run and subsequent invasion of Maryland. How, given so many advantages, did operational stalemate, followed by strategic crisis, result in so short a time?

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book Nanoscience and Nanotechnology: National Nanotechnology Initiative Strategic Plan 2011, Designing Materials to Revolutionize and Engineer our Future (DMREF) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Fort Leavenworth: The People Behind the Names: People Who Have Left Their Mark on the Dowager Queen of Frontier Forts – Fort History, Geography, Buildings, Stained Glass Windows, Streets and Trails by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Sustaining Souls: Work of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps, Soldiers and Families, Religious Formation and Chaplain Identity, Ethos, Commander Assessment of Effectiveness by Progressive Management
Cover of the book A Brief History of Vance AFB and the 71st Flying Training Wing: Training America's Best Pilots For 66 Years - Lineage and Honors, Stations, Aircraft, Decorations, Commanders by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber Operations During 1942 and 1943: Building Doctrine and Forces that Triumphed in the World War II Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid, Skip-Bombing by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Documents: Air Force Aviation Management Instruction - Guidance for Administering Aircrew Flight Management Programs for Flying Unit Commanders and Aircrew Personnel by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Unified Land Operations - Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-0, ADRP 3-0, Combined Arms, Warfighting Functions (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Allied Perspectives - Asia, Europe, France, Shift from Neo-Gaullism, Germany, Armed Forces, ISR, Efficient Use of Military Force by Progressive Management
Cover of the book From One Leader to Another: Volumes I and II – Observations, Insights, and Advice from Over 50 Serving and Retired Senior NCOs on Tasks, Skills, Values, and Responsibilities for the Army Today by Progressive Management
Cover of the book War in the Shallows: U.S. Navy Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam 1965-1968 - Swift Boats, Vung Ro Incident, Arnheiter Affair, Game Warden, Mining, Trawler Intercepts, Tet, Task Force Clearwater by Progressive Management
Cover of the book United States Army Command and General Staff Officers Course Preparatory Curriculum Evaluation: Study of CGSOC Effectiveness Reveals Failure to Meet College Standards by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Great Things Have Been Done by a Few Men: Operational Art in Clark's Illinois Campaign of 1778 - 1779 - General George Rogers Clark's Place in History, American Revolution, Key Events, Vincennes by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Documents: Air Force Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment, Counter CBRNE, WMD, NBC Weapons by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Modern Catholic Just War Tradition: Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI, Pacifism, Presumption Against War or For Justice, Questions and Suggestions, Moral Reasoning for War by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Nuclear Weapons and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - 2012 Issues with Weapon Limitations, Stockpile Surveillance Program, Management and Oversight by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy